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The Concept of CHURCH
In the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
JOSEPH

D.GARLAND*

WILLIAM

F.

CAHILL

S THE SOCIETY for the Propagation of the Faith, an association founded
for the support of Catholic Missions throughout the world, entitled to
the special tax treatment granted "churches" by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954? Indeed, what organizations of the Roman Catholic
Church qualify as "churches" under the new law which grants favorable
tax treatment for contributions made to a "church or a convention or
association of churches," ' and continues to exempt "a church or a
convention or association of churches" from the tax imposed on the
"unrelated business income" of most other beneficent organizations? 2
Obviously, the institution which can establish its character as a "church"
under these provisions of the Act will improve the tax standing of its
contributors, a factor which may be reflected in more liberal contributtions, and will save itself payment of taxes on any "unrelated business
income" it may have.
The first purpose of this article is to demonstrate, by an examination
of the history of the legislation, that the phrase in question, "a church
or a convention or association of churches," is to be characterized by the
internal law of the denomination which controls the institution receiving
the contribution or earning the income. Then, we shall show what
institutions and organizations are entitled, under the Canon Law of the
Roman Catholic Church, to be characterized as "churches."

Deduction for Gifts
The new law introduces an entirely new concept in the area of the
deductibility of charitable contributions by raising the limit on the
percentage of adjusted gross income which can be deducted by an individual as a contribution from 20 percent to 30 percent, provided the
extra 10 percent is made up of contributions to "a church or a convention or association of churches," a tax-exempt educational organization,
or a hospital. Thus, a taxpayer may now contribute 10 percent of his
adjusted gross income to a church and in addition retain the ordinary
limitation of 20 percent for other contributions which may be made to
all types of exempt organizations, including churches.
For example, a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income is $10,000
*For a biographical sketch of the authors see page 78.
1954 Int. Rev. Code §170(b)(1)(A)(i).
1954 Int. Rev. Code §511(a) (2) (A), substantially unchanged from 1939 Int.
Rev. Code §421(b)(1)(A).

may deduct $3,000 as charitable contributions if he has given at least $1,000 to
"churches." More concretely, if the Society
for the Propagation of the Faith is a "church,"
a $3,000 deduction would be permitted if
his contributions were the following: Library
Association, $1,000; Boy Scout Camp, $500;
Society for the Propagation of the Faith,
$1,500. If the Society for the Propagation of
the Faith is not a "church," his allowable deduction would be only $2,000. 3
Further, if the Society for the Propagation
of the Faith is a "church," this $1,500 gift
would actually cost an unmarried taxpayer
only $1,050. Of course, as the adjusted gross
income of our taxpayer increases, the amount
of the allowable deduction and the tax saving increases with it. If his adjusted gross
income were $25,000 and his contributions
were made in the same proportion of adjusted gross income, his cost for the gift of
$3,750 to the Society for the Propagation
of the Faith would be only $1,776.
Unrelated Business Income
As noted above, the definition of the
phrase is also meaningful because of the provisions exempting "a church or a convention
or an association of churches" from the tax
imposed on the unrelated business income of
certain other exempt organizations. Unrelated business income is income derived by
an exempt organization from the conduct of
a trade or business "which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such
organization for income or funds or the use
it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such organization of
its charitable, educational, or other purpose
or function constituting the basis for its
In addition, there are special provisions of the
new law under which the income of a trust which
would ordinarily be taxed to the grantor, as the
substantial owner, is not taxable to him if the
income of the trust is irrevocably payable for a
period of two years or more to a church, an educational institution or a hospital, even though the
grantor retains a reversionary interest (1954 Int.
Rev. Code §673), or a power, exercisable at the
end of such a period, to control the beneficial
enjoyment (§674), or to revoke (§676).
8

exemption." '4 If such a business is regularly
carried on, the income therefrom is taxable
to most exempt organizations other than "a
church or a convention or association of
churches."
As an example, two farms are owned and
operated by "Catholic organizations;" the
first by X Post of the Catholic War Veterans,
the second by the School Sisters of Notre
Dame de Namour. We will suppose that,
contrary to usual practice, in this case the
ownership and operation of these farms are
not substantially related to the basic functions of these organizations. Because the
Post is an organization merely approved by
the Catholic Church, its farm income is
taxable. Because the congregation of Sisters
is a corporate entity established by the law
of the Church, as we shall show, the congregation is a "church" and its farm income
is not taxable.
In addition to these two highly significant
uses of the word "church," the new Internal
Revenue Code also employs the term in other
provisions of relatively narrow implication
wherein the meaning is to a large extent
controlled by the context.5
Revenue Act of 1950
The phrase, "a church or a convention or
association of churches," first appeared in
' 1954 Int. Rev. Code §513 (a), substantially unchanged from 1939 Int. Rev. Code §422(b).
'For example: 1954 Int. Rev. Code §3121(b)(8)
(A), substantially unchanged from 1939 Int. Rev.
Code §1426(b)(9)(A), exempts from the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, "service performed by a duly ordained, commissioned, or
licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his
ministry or by a member of a religious order in
the exercise of duties required by such orders";
1954 Int. Rev. Code §4233(a)(l)(A)(i), substantially unchanged from 1939 Int. Rev. Code
§ 1701 (a) ( 1) (A) (i), exempts from the Admissions
Tax the proceeds of any entertainment inuring
exclusively to the benefit of, "a church or a convention or association of churches"; and, 1954 Int.
Rev. Code §5121(c), substantially unchanged from
1939 Int. Rev. Code §3250(e)(3), grants special
alcoholic beverage tax treatment to fraternal, civic,

church, labor, etc., organizations selling certain
malt liquids on the occasion of any kind of entertainment, etc., held by them.

the Revenue Act of 19506 which originally
imposed the tax on the unrelated business
income of certain otherwise exempt organizations, but specifically exempted "a church or
a convention or an association of churches."
Unfortunately, the Committee Reports accompanying the 1950 Revenue Act and the
regulations promulgated thereunder were
confusing as to the precise meaning and
scope of the phrase used in the legislation,
"a church, a convention or association of
churches." For example, the Senate Report
accompanying the bill provided, "Religious organizations are subject to such tax
even though organized under church auspices. This is also true of organizations with
charitable, educational, etc., purposes which
are organized under church auspices." 7 The
Conference Committee Report stated that
"[t] he tax does not apply to income of this
type received by a church (or an association
or convention of churches) even though the
church is held in the name of a bishop or
other church official. However, the tax does
apply to other exempt institutions operating
under the auspices of a "church." 8 The regulations provided: "Churches and associations or conventions of churches are exempt
from the Supplement U tax. The exemption
is applicable only to an organization which
itself is a church or an association or a convention of churches. Religious organizations,
including religious orders, if not themselves
churches or associations or conventions of
churches, and all other organizations which
are organized or operated under church
auspices, are subject to the Supplement U
tax, whether or not they carry out a religious,
educational, or charitable function approved
by a church. For example, an incorporated
university exempt from tax under section
101 (6) is subject to the Supplement U tax
whether or not it was organized by or is
operated under the auspices of a church." 9
'Revenue Act of 1950, §301(a).
'Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950);
2 U. S. Code Cong. Serv. 3164 (1950).
' Statement of H.R. 8920 as agreed to by the
Conferees, 2 U. S. Code Cong. Serv. 3240 (1950).
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.421-2(a)3 (1950).

(Emphasis supplied).
But, what religious orders and what religious organizations were "churches" so as
to qualify for the exemption? This led to the
further question - What law was to be used
to characterize a church? Was it some Federal Common Law which may still survive
the glancing blow of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins? 0 Was it the local law of the state of
incorporation, or formation, or principal
headquarters of the religious organization?
Or was it the internal local law of the
ecclesiastical group itself? Any attempt to
characterize the phrase under American
common law was doomed to failure since
the word church is found in the common
law in a variety of circumstances, none of
which are helpful in construing the term as
used in the Internal Revenue Code."
1951 Amendments
When amendments were made to the
Excise Tax in the Revenue Act of 1951,12
exemption from the admissions tax was
granted for entertainments which were for
the exclusive benefit of "a church or a convention or association of churches."'1 3 This
constituted the second use of the phrase, but
the Committee Reports remained silent as
to its meaning. The regulations issued pursuant to this section,' 4 however, provided that:
"The term 'convention or association of
"304 U. S. 64 (1938).
"See, e.g., Robertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 64, 95
(N.Y. 1850) (a building consecrated to the honor
of God or religion); Church of the Holy Faith, Inc.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 39 N.M. 403, 48 P. 2d
777, 778 (1935) (a society of persons who profess
the Christian religion); Trustees of the Baptist
Society in Amwell v. Fisher, 18 N.J.L. 254, 257
(1841) (a spiritual or religious corporation); Doan
v. Vestry of Parish of Ascension, 103 Md. 662, 64
AtI. 314, 316 (1906) (a body of Christians worshiping in a particular church edifice or constituting
one congregation).
'Revenue Act of 1951, §402(b).
131939 Int. Rev. Code §1701(a)(1)(A)(i); retained in the new law, 1954 Int. Rev. Code §4233
(a) (I) (A) (i).
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 43, §101.15(b)2 (1941),
amended.

as

churches' includes a union of churches of
the same denomination organized on a regional or other basis, or a union of churches
of different denominations which meet and
act in concert to further a particular religious
purpose. Missions and missionary societies,
Sunday school classes, choir groups and other
organizations forming a functional part of
the organization of a church fall within the
exception." Thus, while the regulations under
the admissions tax provisions of the former
Internal Revenue Code did not clarify the
definition of the phrase, they did appear to
be somewhat broader in scope and application than the regulations issued regarding
the unrelated business income of exempt
organizations.

The New Code
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code and the
committee reports accompanying it, however,
laid to rest all doubt. They have established
that the phrase, "a church or a convention or
association of churches," is to be given a
broad application and is to be characterized
under the internal law of the ecclesiastical
organization itself.
The House bill" authorized the special 10
percent additional limitation for charitable
contributions when the contribution was to "a
church or a convention or association of
churches or a religious order." When the bill
came before the Committee on Finance of the
United States Senate, the phrase "or a religious order" was deleted from the provisions
of the bill. The reason for this deletion is
stated in the Report of the Committee on Finance 16 as follows: "Your committee understands that 'church' to some denominations
includes religious orders as well as other organizations which, as integral parts of the
church are engaged in carrying out the functions of the church whether as separate corporations or otherwise. It is believed that the
term 'church' should be all inclusive. To retain the phrase 'or a religious order' in this

section of the bill will tend to limit the term
and may lead to confusion in the interpretation of other provisions of the bill relating to
a church, or convention or association of
churches. Accordingly, your committee believes that the section of the bill will be clari17
fied by this amendment.

The Intent of Congress
Thus, there is a clear manifestatio'n of congressional intent that the phrase, "a church
or a convention or association of churches,"
wherever appearing in the Internal Revenue
Code, is to be characterized by the internal
law of the denomination itself. It is of special
interest to note that the action of the Senate
Finance Committee was apparently induced
by the testimony of Mr. Eugene J. Butler, Director, Legal Department, National Catholic
Welfare Conference. In his statement,' s Mr.
Butler urged the committee to delete the
phrase "or a religious order" from the House
bill on the ground that the use of such term
might tend to limit the scope of the word
"church" as used in the Internal Revenue
Code. Demonstrating that the fundamental
law of the Roman Catholic Church, Canon
Law, regarded religious orders and other organizations as integral parts of the Church,
he requested that any implication that the
term "church" was to be given only a limited
application be avoided by eliminating the
words "or a religious order" and that an appropriate explanation for the deletion be
made part of the committee report. This is
exactly what was done.
With the principle established that the
phrase, "a church or a convention or association of churches," is to be characterized under the internal law of the appropriate ecclesiastical denomination, the only problem
remaining is what organizations within any
ecclesiastical group qualify as "churches"
under this internal law. For purposes of this
article, we shall consider the question only

15

17 See

(1954).

1027 (1954).

H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., §170 (1954).
Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30

also, id. at 207.

18Part

II, Hearings before Committee on Finance,
U. S. Senate, on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.

as it affects the Roman Catholic Church;
namely, what organizations in the Roman
Catholic Church are classified as churches
by Canon Law.
Church Property and Churches
Fortunately, there is perfect coordination
between the Canon Law and the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Code is
concerned with property, of which money is
but one instance, 9 given to or earned by a
church. Since the Catholic Church as such,
the "Church Universal," does not in fact acquire, or hold, or administer property, the
question arises: what property is the property
of the Roman Catholic Church?
Under Canon Law, any property owned by
a moral person in the Church is "Church"
property.20 The phrase "moral persons in the
Church" may have a strange sound to ears
attuned to the language of the common law.
Canon 99 declares that there are in the
Church, besides physical persons, also moral
persons, established by public authority. Writers on the civil law distinguish persons into
"natural" and "juristic" classes. For the latter
they use also the terms "moral bodies,"
"moral entities," "autonomous moral entities."'21 Analogously, English and American
law dictionaries distinguish "natural" and
"artificial" persons. Thus, a moral person in
the Church is an entity, other than a natural
person, endowed by law or by competent
ecclesiastical authority with legal personality.
A person at law is an entity in which inhere
rights and obligations, the most basic of which
are those relating to the ownership of property
and to the capacity to sue and to be sued.
The Catholic Church, called also in the
Canons, "the Church Universal, ' 22 is by divine
right a moral person. 23 It is explicitly declared
to have the right to acquire, to hold and ad-

minister temporal goods as a means of achiev24
ing the purposes for which the Church exists.
As pointed out above, however, no property
of any kind is held by the Church Universal.
It follows, therefore, that, if there is any
Church property at all, it is that which is held
by the moral persons in the Church.
In fact, the moral persons holding Church
property are so closely identified with the
Church itself, that the very name "Church"
is applied to these moral persons in some of
the Canons. For example, Canon 1498 enacts
that in the Canons which follow it (to
Can. 1551, inclusive), the word "Ecclesia"
(Church) signifies all moral persons in the
Church, unless the context of a Canon or its
subject matter indicates a more restricted
sense of the term in that place. All the Canons
numbered from 1498 to 1551 treat of Church
property.
Conversely, no natural person may own
Church property. 25 Even the Pope, who is the
Head of the Church and the incumbent of the
Apostolic See, the successor of St. Peter in the
Bishopric of Rome, is not the owner of
Church property, although the Apostolic See,
a moral person, does in fact receive, hold and
administer Church property. By virtue of his
office, the Pope is declared in Church law to
be the "supreme administrator and dispenser"
of Church property. 26 But, he is not the
owner of such property.
The exclusion of any natural person from
ownership of Church property is no new
concept. Writing about 1270, St. Thomas
Aquinas discussed the problem of whether the
"income of any church" could be considered
the personal property of the Pope. Aquinas
dismissed the suggestion: "Though the property of the Church is his [the Pope's] in the
sense that he is the supreme dispenser thereof,
it is not his in the sense of being in his own-

9

2

'Can.

'Cf. Can. 1497,§1 (Church property is owned by
moral persons in the Church); Can. 1499,§2 ("The
ownership of property, subject to the supreme
authority of the Apostolic See, belongs to that
moral person in the Church which has legitimately
acquired that property.").
"Can. 1518.

For example: 1954 Int. Rev. Code §317(a)
includes money within the meaning of property as
used in Sub-chapter C.
'Can. 1497,§1.
"1Ferrara, Le Persone Giuridiche, Turin, 1938,
pp. 12, 13.
' Can. 1498.
100,§ 1.

Can. 1499,§1.

ership or possession. '27 Canonists generally
agree that the Pope's power is that of exercising eminent domain, and of directing the activities of moral persons in the Church in the
28
management of their property.
The status of the Pope in regard to Church
property is somewhat analogous to the relationship of the President of the United States
to federal property. While the President, together with Congress and the Judiciary, has
the power to exercise dominion and control
over government property, he is in no sense
the owner of such property.
This power of the Pope over the administration of the property of moral persons in the
Church, as well as the explicit designation of
ecclesiastical moral persons as "churches,"
makes the conclusion inescapable that the
property of moral persons in the Church is
the property of the Church itself.
Control of Church Property
The Pope is the "Ordinary" of the whole
Church. He has, however, communicated by
law some of his powers as "supreme administrator and dispenser of Church property" to
inferior ordinaries. Ordinaries are persons
who, by virtue of their office, exercise jurisdiction over the Church in specified territories,
such as Bishops and their Vicars General, or
within specified groups of persons in the
29
Church, such as major religious superiors*
The law of the Church requires that the Ordinaries shall: supervise the administration of
all Church property in their territories;30 make
rules for such administration and, usually, appoint the administrators thereof;31 direct investment of surplus funds and reinvestment of
all funds;3 2 receive annual accounting from
all adminstrators;3 - authorize the administrators to bring or defend suits affecting the
property in their charge.A4 The license of the
.'Summa Theologica I'-I",
q. 100, a. 1, ad 7.
" Can. 1499,§2 (see n. 25 supra).
2"Can.
197; 198.
' Can. 1519,§1.
" Can. 1519,§2; 1521.
Can. 1523, n. 4; 1539,§2.
"Can. 1525.
" Can. 1526.

Ordinary, and in cases where the value exceeds a certain limit, the permission of the
Holy See, is required for alienation of Church
property. Alienation includes not only sale
and gift by which title passes, but even engagements which render title or possession
of capital property somewhat limited or insecure, e.g., long leases, mortgages, pledges,
and certain other types of debt. 35 Similar
permission is required for an administrator
to refuse a gift to his Church.3 6 Where property represents a gift whose donor has indicated a specific purpose, the dedication of
the property to that purpose is to be supervised by the Ordinary.37 His duties are even
more exigent when the gift is held in trust
by a moral person which may use only the
38
income produced by the gift property.
Consideration of these safeguards and controls over the property of moral persons in
the Church makes even more evident and
more meaningful the fact that the property
of such moral persons is Church property.
Moral Persons in the Church
Moral persons in the Church are of two
types, collegiate and non-collegiate. Collegiate
moral persons are founded on a group of
natural persons, such as the members of a
religious order, and non-collegiate moral persons are founded on a specific piece of property, such as a shrine.
The collegiate moral person (corporation
or universitas personarum) has its origin in
Roman Law, and is described in the Digest of
Justinian. 3 9 That text recognizes certain collegii and societates which have a corpus, hold
property in common through a common treasury, and which have standing in court
through their syndics (actor sive syndicus).
The text declares that their property rights
and their jus standi are modeled on the analogous rights of the state itself. Modern writers
say that the juristic personality of such cor" Can. 1530-32; 1281; 1533; 1538; 1541-42.

"Can. 1536.
"Can. 1491,§1; 1493.
"Can. 1546,§1; 44.
"L. 1,Sec. 1,D. quod cuiusc. univ. nor. 3, 4.

porations is erected by the authority of the
state upon the substratum of the group of
natural persons who are members thereof.
The non-collegiate moral person may have
taken its origin from the pious foundations of
late Roman Law, but there is reason to believe that these fundationes, which included
funds for redemption of captives as well as
such welfare institutions as orphanages and
hospitals, had not a juristic personality of
their own. Whatever may have been the juridical status of such universitates bonorum in
Roman Law, there is no doubt that there were
in the Middle Ages, especially in the ecclesiastical law, juristic persons founded upon a
substratum not of persons but of property.
These were called universitatesbonorum, and
they certainly had autonomous property rights
and rights of suit. It may be that the Church
doctrine which holds Her to be the mystical
body of Christ inspired the medieval jurists
to recognize a juristic personality abstracted
from any membership held by natural persons. 40 Or this concept may have had its
genesis in the Germanic notion that the very
edifice which was the center of a religious or
charitable activity owned the lands which
were given for the use of the charity, or in
the older concept which held the titular saint
41
to be owner of the property.
In all events, modern writers on the civil
law clearly recognize the distinction between
corporations, whose juristic personality is
founded on their membership of natural persons, and institutes whose juristic personality
finds its substratum in a patrimony of prop42
erty.
Whatever be the substratum upon which a
moral person in the Church may be erected,
the Canon Law clearly requires that juristic
personality shall be conferred by competent
authority. 43 Thus not every association of
Catholics, and not every enterprise which
serves a distinctly Catholic religious purpose,
" Ferrara, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 10.
"Cf. 1 Pollock and Maitland, The History of
England Before the Time of Edward 1 497-502
(2d ed. 1899).
"Ferrara, op cit. supra note 21, at pp. 40-45.

'Can. 99.

is a moral person in the Church. Moral persons in the Church are juristic personalities
which are either: recognized as such by the
law of the Church, constituted such by the
law of the Church, or constituted such by
authority competent under the law of the
Church. Canon 100 indicates the manner in
which the authority of the Church acts in
these matters.
Status Conferred by Law
Certain collegiate groups in the Church,
and certain institutes, are explicitly or implicitly recognized or constituted by law as
juristic personalities. 44 For example Canon
100, §1 explicity recognizes the Catholic
Church and the Apostolic See as moral persons by divine right. Not by divine right, but
by explicit declaration of the Canon Law,
juristic personality is conferred upon all dio47
ceses, 45 all parishes 46 and seminaries. Similar explicit attribution of moral personality in
the Church is made to all religious orders and
religious congregations, and to their provinces
and their houses. 48 One should note that "religious" is here taken in the strict sense of
Canon 488, and applies only to institutes
whose members, in pursuit of Christian perfection, live their lives in common and make
their vows publicly. 49 The religious orders of
men include, in addition to the Benedictine
and other monastic institutes, the Franciscan
and Dominican mendicants, and the Jesuits;
among the orders of women are the Poor
Clares, the Carmelite and Dominican nuns.
Some of the larger religious congregations are
the Brothers of the Christian Schools, the
Salesians, the Sisters of St. Joseph and the
Sisters of Mercy.
In other cases, the Canon Law confers
juristic personality upon various classes of
ecclesiastical entities, not by declaring ex"Can. 100,§1.
"Can. 1557,§2, n. 2.
"Can. 1209,§1.
" Can. 99; 1409.
"Can. 536.
"Every vow is a promise made to God; a public
vow is accepted by an ecclesiastical superior acting
for the Church; vows not thus officially accepted
are private.

plicitly that these entities are moral persons
in the Church, but making the same declaration implicitly. The attribution of juristic personality is implied in a law which declares
that certain ecclesiastical entities are capable
of holding property in their own dominion,
or that they are capable of suing or of being
sued in the courts of the Church. This is the
case with public oratories50 and with pious
places such as shrines. 51 Thus also is moral
personality conferred by the law upon the societies which pursue the life of perfection by
living in common without public vows. 52 The
Vincentian Fathers, the Maryknoll Fathers,
the Sulpicians, the Daughters of Charity of St.
Vincent de Paul, are societies of the common
life.
We have not indicated all the classes of
moral persons in the Church so constituted by
operation of law, but have restricted our consideration here, as we shall in the following
section, to those types of ecclesiastical entities
which commonly receive and hold property in
the United States.
Status Conferred by Decree
The last clause of Canon 100, §1 indicates
the method by which ecclesiastical authority
acts to confer juristic personality on individual corporations and institutes which have
not that character by operation of law. The
Canon provides that any such grant of moral
personality in the Church shall be made by
formal decree of a competent ecclesiastical
superior. The superior is, of course, an Ordinary or his delegate, since the act to be accomplished is one of true jurisdiction. Most
canonists insist that the decree must make
the grant of juristic personality in explicit
terms, or at least imply the grant by making
attribution of the right to hold property or the
53
right of suit.
50

Can. 1188,.2,n. 1; 1191; 1298.
" 1Can. 1298,§ 1.
Can. 676,§ 1, cum. 536.
"'A few canonists see an exception to this rule in
some special cases. Cf. Gillet, La personalite
12

juridique en droit ecclesiastique, Malines, 1927, p.
249; Ciprotti, De formali decreto quo persona
moralis constituitur, in Consultationes luris Canonici, Rome, 1939, vol. II, p. 23.

Canon 100 does not leave the Ordinaries
free to make these grants of juristic personality to any group or institute without distinction. It requires that the decree of the Ordinary shall issue for a "religious or charitable
purpose." The Ordinary is, therefore, obliged
to restrict such grants to those groups and
institutes whose work he shall determine,
upon investigation, to be "pious" in the canonical sense.5 4 The canonical standard of piety is
objective. A group or an institute for which
a decree is petitioned is not to be judged pious
or religious or charitable in the sense of the
Canons merely because its sponsors have subjective motives stemming from the virtues of
piety, religion, or charity. The internal motive of a man's act may please God, but so
long as that motive is purely internal even the
Canon Law cannot judge it pious. 5
The character of the works undertaken
rather than the subjective dispositions of their
sponsors and executors governs the judgment
of the Ordinary in these matters. If the work
has for its direct effect the worship of God,
as would be the case, for example, in a society
whose purpose is to arrange for celebration
of Masses for the dead, then the institute
carrying on such work has an objectively religious purpose. Where the activity contemplated is one of the spiritual works of mercy,
as for example, the visitation of the sick for
the purpose of instructing and encouraging
them in the performance of acts of religious
obligation or devotion, the purpose of the
institute is obviously one of charity in a distinctly religious sense. Here the economic or
social status of the beneficiaries is not a factor
"'The canonical concept of "piety" has been defined classically by Molina: "Therefore, whatever
is done principally for God's sake, or for a supernatural motive, to merit grace or glory in God's
sight, or to make satisfaction for one's own sins or
for those of others, is rightly called pious." (De
iustitia et iure, Opera Omnia, Cologne, 1733, Tom
I, disp. 134).
'As Navarrus said, "Sometimes what God takes
for piety, is found profane by the judges, and
conversely what is profane in the sight of His
Divine Majesty, is reputed pious among men."
(Tractatus de Reditibus Beneficiorum Ecclesiasticorum, Rome, 1568, n. 61, p. 74).

in the adjudication that this institute is a
canonically pious one, for all men are in spiritual need.
But when the good work to be accomplished addresses itself directly to the relief of
physical necessity, a two-fold test of its canonically religious, charitable, or pious character
must be applied. First there must be in the
beneficiaries a real need.56 Secondly, there is
to be applied here the test of religious purpose. 57 Thus, an institution for the relief of
poverty or ignorance or illness whose aim is
simply to relieve the social ills consequent
upon such misfortune cannot become a moral
person in the Church. The creation of corporations for such merely humanitarian purposes is exclusively in the province of the civil
power. But if an institution is set up to relieve
these material necessities and is planned at the
same time to effect religious formation in its
beneficiaries, then, these joint aims will warrant issuance of an Ordinary's decree by
which that establishment shall be brought
within the class of ecclesiastical moral persons. A Bishop examining such an institution
will have ground for an affirmative finding
that the two-fold test described above has
here been met.
When Is Decree Needed?
Grant of juristic personality in the Church,
not by operation of law, but by special decree
of a competent ecclesiastical superior, affects
principally three general types of institutions
or organizations within the Church: "ecclesiastical institutes," whose purpose is religious
or charitable;58 associations of the faithful,
formed for the purpose of advancing the religious life of their members, .or for works of
'That is postulated by the teaching of Christ and
His Apostles regarding these corporal works of
mercy. Christ speaks of the hungry and the naked
(Matt. 25, 35); St. James also emphasizes need in
those who are the proper objects of good works:
"naked and in want of daily food" (James 2, 15).
"Christ's words (Matt. 25, 34-46) demand an
identification of the needy with Himself. The
essential point of St. James' discourse (James 2,
14-26) is that the works of practical charity are
an expression of religious faith.
'Can. 1489,§1; 1375.

piety and charity, or to promote the public
worship of the Church;5 9 and secular institutes.
The Pontifical Society for the Propagation
of the Faith exists throughout the Catholic
world in virtue of the Motu Proprio of our
late Holy Father, Pope Pius XI, given 3 May
1922. This charter grants to the Society the
status of a moral person in the Church. The
grant of juristic personality is not expressed,
but is implicit in the Statutes granted to the
Society which make mention of the rights
to receive, administer, and disburse all kinds
of property for the benefit of Catholic Missions; for example, Statua Generalia, VI, IX,
X, XI. 60 Thus, there can be no question but
that the Society for the Propagation of the
Faith qualifies as a "church" under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and that contributions to it are subject to the increased
percentage limitation and that the income
from any unrelated business activity is not
taxed to it.
Secular institutes are too new to the Canon
Law to have found a place in the Code promulgated in 1917, and those few secular institutes which exist in the United States are
still in an experimental stage of development.
Yet, because these organizations may play a
very large part in the activity of the Church in
America, we feel it necessary to make special
mention of them and their standing as moral
persons in the Church. They are societies of
persons within the Church, whose members
bind themselves by public vows to the pursuit
of Christian perfection in their own lives, and
also dedicate themselves under the rule of
their institute to various works of religion and
charity. They do not live in communities as
do the members of religious institutes and
members of societies of the common life. Yet,
the members of the secular institutes, through
their vows and the rule by which they are
bound, devote their lives to religion with a
completeness and stability which set these institutes distinctly apart from mere associations of the laity. The canonical status of the
"Can. 685; 687.
' Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. XIV, p. 327.

secular institutes is based upon the Constitution given by our present Pope, Pius XII, on
February 2, 1947. Article V, section 1, of that
Constitution, reserves to Bishops, excluding
other Ordinaries, the power to grant, by special decree, the status of a moral person in the
Church, to a secular institute. 61
The Canons 62 clearly distinguish decrees of
approval and decrees of erection given such
institutes and associations from the decree by
which moral personality in the Church is conferred upon these entities. That distinction
has great practical importance. For example,
a lay association merely approved by the
Church and an institute erected in the property of a parish or a religious house enjoy no
juristic personality; property destined for the
use of either unincorporated entity must be
held in trust. The trustee will be either an
ecclesiastical moral person, such as the parish
or religious house, or a natural person, or
3 Bouscaren, Canon Law Digest 144 (1954).
"Cf. Can. 686; 1491,§2; 1412,§2.

"

civil corporation. If the trustee is not an
ecclesiastical moral person, the trust property
is not church property and its management is
subject to ecclesiastical supervision only indirectly, insofar as the Ordinary is by law
63
executor of pious wills and trusts.
Conclusion
This highly abbreviated exposition of the
nature, the rights and obligations, and the
method of creation of moral persons in the
Church should make it evident that these
moral persons are "churches" within the contemplation of the Internal Revenue Code and
are specific illustrations of the proposition
expressed in the Committee Report that
" 'church' to some denominations includes religious orders as well as other organizations
which, as integral parts of the church are
engaged in carrying out functions of the
church whether as separate corporations or
otherwise."
' Can. 1515-1517.

Contributions Through A Fund-Raising Foundation
A recent revenue ruling, Revenue Rule 55-1, Internal Revenue Bulletin 1955-1,6,
provides that the special additional 10% limitation on contributions made to
churches, certain educational organizations and hospitals will be applicable, under
certain conditions, to gifts made through an organized non-profit independent charity
fund-raising foundation. If the donor, in satisfaction of a general pledge, delivers
to the foundation a check drawn to the order of a specific organization which qualifies for the special tax treatment and the check is directly and unconditionally
forwarded to that organization by the foundation without charge, in accordance with
the rules and practices of the foundation, the additional 10% limitation will apply
to the amount of the contribution.

Substantiationof Special Treatment
The new ruling also provides that claims for deductions subject to the special
limitation must be substantiated, when required by the Commissioner, by a statement from the organization to which the contribution or gift was made showing
whether the organization is of the type qualified for special treatment, the name
and address of the contributor or donor, the amount of the contribution or gift and
the date of the actual payment thereof, and other special information as the Commissioner may deem necessary.

